Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Gorgias', 'talk' and 'Relativism'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


51 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / d. Contemporary philosophy
There has been a distinct 'Social Turn' in recent philosophy, like the earlier 'Linguistic Turn' [O'Grady]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Is a gifted philosopher unmanly if he avoids the strife of the communal world? [Plato]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Good reasoning will avoid contradiction, enhance coherence, not ignore evidence, and maximise evidence [O'Grady]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 2. Elenchus
In "Gorgias" Socrates is confident that his 'elenchus' will decide moral truth [Vlastos on Plato]
We should test one another, by asking and answering questions [Plato]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 7. Thought Experiments
Just as maps must simplify their subject matter, so thought has to be reductionist about reality [O'Grady]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
To say a relative truth is inexpressible in other frameworks is 'weak', while saying it is false is 'strong' [O'Grady]
The epistemic theory of truth presents it as 'that which is licensed by our best theory of reality' [O'Grady]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Logical relativism appears if we allow more than one legitimate logical system [O'Grady]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
A third value for truth might be "indeterminate", or a point on a scale between 'true' and 'false' [O'Grady]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Wittgenstein reduced Russell's five primitive logical symbols to a mere one [O'Grady]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Anti-realists say our theories (such as wave-particle duality) give reality incompatible properties [O'Grady]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
What counts as a fact partly depends on the availability of human concepts to describe them [O'Grady]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
We may say that objects have intrinsic identity conditions, but still allow multiple accounts of them [O'Grady]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Maybe developments in logic and geometry have shown that the a priori may be relative [O'Grady]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
Sense-data are only safe from scepticism if they are primitive and unconceptualised [O'Grady]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
Modern epistemology centres on debates about foundations, and about external justification [O'Grady]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
Internalists say the reasons for belief must be available to the subject, and externalists deny this [O'Grady]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Coherence involves support from explanation and evidence, and also probability and confirmation [O'Grady]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
Ontological relativists are anti-realists, who deny that our theories carve nature at the joints [O'Grady]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 2. Knowledge as Convention
Contextualism says that knowledge is relative to its context; 'empty' depends on your interests [O'Grady]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
One may understand a realm of ideas, but be unable to judge their rationality or truth [O'Grady]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Verificationism was attacked by the deniers of the analytic-synthetic distinction, needed for 'facts' [O'Grady]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
If we abandon the analytic-synthetic distinction, scepticism about meaning may be inevitable [O'Grady]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Rhetoric is irrational about its means and its ends [Plato]
Rhetoric can produce conviction, but not educate people about right and wrong [Plato]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / a. Translation
Early Quine says all beliefs could be otherwise, but later he said we would assume mistranslation [O'Grady]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
Cryptographers can recognise that something is a language, without translating it [O'Grady]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / b. Types of intention
All activity aims at the good [Plato]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / g. Will to power
Moral rules are made by the weak members of humanity [Plato]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / h. Fine deeds
A good person is bound to act well, and this brings happiness [Plato]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Is it natural to simply indulge our selfish desires? [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
In slaking our thirst the goodness of the action and the pleasure are clearly separate [Plato]
Good should be the aim of pleasant activity, not the other way round [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
Good and bad people seem to experience equal amounts of pleasure and pain [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
In a fool's mind desire is like a leaky jar, insatiable in its desires, and order and contentment are better [Plato]
If happiness is the satisfaction of desires, then a life of scratching itches should be happiness [Plato]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 2. Hedonism
Is the happiest state one of sensual, self-indulgent freedom? [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Should we avoid evil because it will bring us bad consequences? [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
I would rather be a victim of crime than a criminal [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / b. Temperance
Self-indulgent desire makes friendship impossible, because it makes a person incapable of co-operation [Plato]
If absence of desire is happiness, then nothing is happier than a stone or a corpse [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
A criminal is worse off if he avoids punishment [Plato]
Do most people praise self-discipline and justice because they are too timid to gain their own pleasure? [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / b. Health
The popular view is that health is first, good looks second, and honest wealth third [Plato]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
As with other things, a good state is organised and orderly [Plato]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / c. Direct democracy
A good citizen won't be passive, but will redirect the needs of the state [Plato]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Do most people like equality because they are second-rate? [Plato]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Does nature imply that it is right for better people to have greater benefits? [Plato]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Stilpo said if Athena is a daughter of Zeus, then a statue is only the child of a sculptor, and so is not a god [Stilpo, by Diog. Laertius]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
The chief problem for fideists is other fideists who hold contrary ideas [O'Grady]